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Abstract. In the Brazilian Amazon, uncontrolled fire is one of the main drivers of 
forest degradation leading to important loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
(ES). Smallholders are often considered as the main actors responsible for these 
damages, as they commonly depend on fire for agricultural management activities. 
Since the 1990’s, different policies and actions have been implemented to control fire 
use, but with limited success and fire continues to be an important problem in the 
region. With the perspective of engaging a participatory policy with stakeholders and 
realistically bring about a transition out of fire in the Amazon, we take stock of 
current knowledge on fire from different science realms and understand how this 
knowledge has influenced policies and institutional arrangements launched in the 
region up to date. Building on a theory of compliance, we overview the policies 
developed to reduce fire in the Brazilian Amazon and identify through a review in the 
recent literature the reasons associated to the generalized non-compliance observed 
until now. Our analyses show that policies launched so far have been focusing solely 
on the negative impacts of fire and as such, radically ban the use of fire in a way that 
is at odds from the practices and motivations of local actors. This flaw explains the 
failure of institutional arrangements in stimulating compliance related to fire risk in 
the region. We sum up the different challenges that need to be addressed to build 
more effective institutional arrangements, which would be more adapted to the actors’ 
motivations and able to encourage environmental services conservation. 
1. Introduction 
While deforestation in the Amazon has decreased by more than 80% in 8 
years, many studies have showed an alarming increase in forest degradation 
mainly caused by accidental fires that lead to forest degradation and threaten 
important ecosystem services (Aragão et al., 2010; Soares-Filho, 2012).  
In tropical regions, fire is a challenging issue, as it is widely used for 
agricultural practices, causing a multiplicity of annual ignition sources 
(Sorrensen, 2009). Although fire is used both by large landowners and small-
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scale farmers, there is a generalized scientific and policy rhetoric against 
smallholders, who are blamed for continuing to make swidden fire (Costa, 
2006). Forest wildfires and swidden fires are distinct realities, but many 
studies tend to make an overlap, impeding proper understanding of the 
determinants of fire (Carmenta, 2013). Intensification of accidental fires is 
generally attributed to a combination of increased forest inflammability, of 
agricultural practices, but also of changing social settings, with increased 
anthropic pressure (Uhl & Buschbacher, 1985; Sorrensen, 2009). Although 
each of these determinants is covered by literature, linkages between spheres 
of knowledge are rare. Difficulty to apprehend the complexity of the fire 
phenomenon thus often leads to oversimplification, miscomprehension, and a 
dominant negative discourse of fire and its effects (Carmenta, 2011). This has 
different pervasive effects, as fire becomes apprehended as uncontrollable and 
badly managed, often leading to prohibition policies, which have limited 
impact as they fail to address the drivers of the use of fire (Sorrenson, 2009) 
and close space for discussion on this issue (Mistry, 1998). In other cases, fire 
risk is simply ignored or evacuated from the debate, which leads to propose 
ingenuous policies, such as is currently the case in the debate regarding 
REDD+ mechanism (Barlow et al., 2012). 
To propose more adapted policies, Mistry & Bizerril (2011) consider it is 
urgent to build a better comprehension of the motivations that lead farmers to 
use fire. There is evidence that motivations are very different between types 
of farmers. In recent years, the strong command-and-control policies put 
forward by the Brazilian federal government to limit deforestation have been 
quite effective with large landowners, as these policies cut credit and markets 
if environmental compliance was not proved (Assunção et al. 2012, 2013). 
However, their effect on small-scale farmers was limited, as these are 
excluded from such market dynamics and have motivations that are mainly 
affected by social and livelihood concerns (Coudel et al., 2012). Some authors 
consider that incentives would be a relevant option (Börner et al., 2010), but 
they might be just as inadequate if focus continues to be on the policy 
conception without understanding farmers’ motivations (Kosoy et al., 2008). 
With the perspective of engaging a participatory policy with stakeholders in 
the Amazon to realistically bring about a transition out of fire, we take stock 
of current knowledge on fire use and understand how this knowledge has 
influenced policies and institutional arrangements suggested up to date. We 
will show that by bringing evidence mainly on the negatives effect of fire, 
science has contributed to radicalize policies against fire, bringing them at 
odds from the practices and motivations of local actors and thus undermining 
compliance First, we present the premises of a theory of compliance which 
understands compliance as the result of a balance between institutional 
arrangements and individual and collective motivations. In the second part, 
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we present the knowledge on fire build by ecological, agronomical and social 
sciences. In a third part, we overview the policies developed specifically to 
reduce fire in Brazil since the 1990’s and identify the institutional conditions 
they led to and what are the reasons given by recent literature for the 
generalized non-compliance. Finally, we sum up the different challenges that 
need to be addressed to build institutional arrangements which would be more 
adapted to the actors’ motivations and thus better encourage preservation of 
environmental services. 
2. Theoretical framework for compliance  
Considering the observation of generalized non-compliance to fire policy 
(Sorrenson, 2009; Mistry & Bizerril, 2011; Carmenta, 2013), it seems 
important to comprehend what determines the (non-)efficiency of a policy. A 
common view will bring elements on the failings of the institutional context, 
because of lack of funding or of capacities (Sorrensen, 2009). Although we 
find the contribution of such studies worthy, we wish to go a step further and 
show that, more fundamentally, the rationale behind these policies is 
inadequate. We thus aim at bringing light on the knowledge underpinning 
these policies.  
Different theories have been developed to understand the link between 
science and policy, such as the triple helix in which the state, firms and civil 
society interact during the policy conception phase, or the actor-network 
theory, which decomposes the networks of science in the making (Callon et 
al. 2001, Akrich et al. 2006). However, these theories focus mainly on the 
process through which scientific knowledge is integrated and translated into 
policies, but they do not address the political consequences (Lamy, 2007). 
This is precisely what we wish to explore, by analyzing how the knowledge 
integrated in a policy will lead it to be more or less consistent with the 
motivations of actors to change their practices or not.  
Policies and regulations are varyingly interpreted, modified and ignored by 
actors at different levels of social organization, leading to differences in “rules 
in use” (Farber, 1999; Ostrom, 1990). The behavior of people to conform to 
the rules that are intended to regulate their actions is defined as compliance 
(Hauck, 2007). The efficiency of a policy depends critically on achieving a 
high level of compliance. In the theory suggested by Gezelius and Hauck 
(2011), compliance is the result of a balance between institutional 
preconditions and individual or group motivations. Motivations to comply 
vary according to the type of institutional conditions, divided into authority, 
economic incentives, social norms, or responsibility building (Gezelius and 
Hauck, 2011; May, 2004; Winter and May, 2001).  
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Inspired by the Gezelius & Hauck framework, we developed our own 
framework (Fig. 1). We will present its sub-elements in the following parts of 
the paper, as we use them for the analysis.  Based on the review of different 
papers addressing fire and policy, we analyze the institutional arrangements 
and individual or group motivations in the context of the conceptual 
framework presented. 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework relating compliance to governable preconditions 
 
3. Knowledge and perceptions of fire from different realms of 
science 
Although slash-and-burn practices have been documented since European 
colonization of the tropics, fire gained wider interest within the scientific 
community in the early 1990s, as ecological findings revealed the broad 
destructive effects accidental fires had on tropical forest and ecosystem 
services associated (Sorrenson 2009, Mistry 1998). Fire increasingly became 
recognized as a ubiquitous problem in Amazonian landscapes, as it led to 
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important ecological, economic and social losses (Nepstad et al. 1999, 
Mendonca et al. 2004). 
3.1. The ecological point of view: fire as a threat to crucial ecosystem 
services 
Ecological studies have mainly focused on how forest fires impact 
ecological systems considering their many different elements such as species 
diversity, biomass stocks or soil nutrients cycling (eg. Barlow & Peres 2008, 
d`Oliveira et al. 2011). Forest fires in a larger scale can affect many 
ecosystem services (Cochrane 2003), including provisioning, regulating or 
cultural services.  
Regarding provisioning ecosystem services, uncontrolled fires destroy 
natural and agro-ecosystems that may contain important cultivated food, fiber 
or timber and non-timber forest products which overall contribute to food 
security and well-being. Many studies in the literature report drastic and long 
term reduction of forest biomass after burning in a mature forest, where more 
than half of the bigger trees were killed (Barlow and Peres 2006). Forest fires 
also affect fauna and flora species composition as demonstrated by numerous 
researches in tropical areas where fire use by agriculture is predominant. Plant 
species composition usually evolves toward species more adapted to open 
areas with lower wood densities (pioneer species) in detriment of shadow 
tolerant species with hard wood that are typical in mature forests (climax 
species). Changes in overall resource availability and environmental 
conditions lead to significant alteration in animal species composition (eg. 
Lees & Peres 2006, Barlow & Peres 2006). In general, modifications in 
biological diversity mediated by fire result in local (and possibly regional) 
extinction of more rare species that usually are the most sensitive to changing 
conditions. 
Overall, these changes result in diminished capacity to provide forest 
resources such as timber for local communities that rely on such resource for 
their livelihoods or non-timber products extracted from trees such as resins, 
exudates, bark, foliage, fruits, seeds and fuel wood are also affected (Ferreira 
et al. 2012). Affordable sources of protein for local human communities 
through hunting can vanish after repeated forest fires. Ecosystem changes and 
biodiversity declines resulting from forest fires invariably affect important 
cultural ecosystem services.   
Effects of fire on regulating ecosystem services can be less obvious than 
provisioning services, at least in a short term, but may have strong 
consequences on the global scale. One of the most important is the massive 
contribution of fires to overall greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), which 
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ultimately affects planetary climate regulation. CO2 emissions from shifting 
cultivation in the Americas, for example, was estimated as an average of 295 
million tons per year (Silva et al. 2011). Reduced humidity and lower local 
precipitation is another important potential consequence of forest fires in 
regulating ecosystem services. This impact occurs mainly because of positive 
feedbacks loops with decreasing water vapor flux from the degraded forest to 
the atmosphere (Nepstad et al. 2001). 
However, confusion between forest fires and swidden fires seems to 
mislead towards dramatic conclusions regarding use of swidden fire 
(Carmenta, 2013). Although swidden fires are often responsible of such 
accidents, very few studies qualify the debate separating impacts of well-
controlled swidden fires and the impacts of large-scale fires (Sorrenson, 
2009). In fact, the ecological impacts of well-controlled swidden fires are 
expected to be lower than  those of intensive farming. This argument has been 
used to support the maintenance of shifting cultivation agriculture that is so 
importantly embedded in the tradition and livelihood of smallholders 
worldwide (Padoch & Pinedo-Vasquez 2010). Slash-and-burn usually 
produces a patchy habitat of agricultural plots, fallow and old-growth forests, 
which may favor a biodiversity mosaic (Padoch & Pinedo-Vasquez 2010). It 
thus seems important to better qualify the debate on extensive versus intensive 
agriculture (see Phalan et al. 2011). Moreover, the overall carbon loss of a 
slash-and-burn system may be at least partially compensated by the recovery 
of biomass if land-use intensity is not excessively high (Omeja et al. 2012, 
Chazdon 1998). The rate of recovery however depends on many factors such 
as land-use intensity and natural factors as soils and climate conditions 
(Gehring et al. 2005).  
Thus, most ecological studies on fire bring knowledge on its devastating 
effects on ecosystems, often relating them to agricultural use of fire. Links 
with swidden fires exist, but since they are rarely investigated, conclusions on 
the impact of swidden fires may be distorted.  
3.2. The agronomical point of view: fire as a cost-effective management 
practice 
Although agricultural studies acknowledge that fire is a cost-effective 
management practice, research efforts have mainly been invested in 
developing alternatives to fire (Pollini 2009).  
In the Brazilian Amazon, fire is widely spread practice given the lack of 
equipment, the limited access to inputs (especially for small farmers) and the 
large forest areas. Fire is used as a substitute of mechanization, expensive 
pesticides, or simply of hard work (Siegert et al. 2001). Fire is commonly 
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related to deforestation, although it is used both for clearing forest or for 
cleaning already opened areas (such as pastures). Fire is traditionally used by 
swidden agriculture, in which farmers clear small areas (on average 1 to 2 ha) 
to plant annual cultures (mainly cassava, but also corn, rice, and a diversity of 
other plants). With the colonization of the Amazon region for cattle raising, 
fire has become used to clear forest to plant pasture. Small farmers have also 
started combining areas with shifting cultivation and permanent pastures, 
often compromising the fallow cycle. 
Agronomy studies show that fire offers several important advantages, such 
as the vegetation removal and its transformation into ashes, bringing a 
temporary fertilization. They act as a source of nutrients, especially 
phosphorus, also increasing the content of exchangeable cations and the pH of 
acidic soils (Martins et al. 1991), which are common in the Amazon region 
(Sánchez 1981). Another advantage is that fire also helps control weeds and 
pests. It enables a clear start in the case of slash-and-burn, and in the case of 
pastures, it helps controlling undesirable species (both plants and animals) 
(Mistry 1998).  
However, fire also causes loss in the organic matter of the soil, which is the 
main reservoir of nutrients for the ecosystem (Sánchez 1981), negatively 
influencing carbon storage (Martins et al. 1991). Therefore, the positive 
effects of fire are valid only for a short period of time (one to two years). 
Moreover, a repeated use of fire will highly degrade the soil and diminish 
agricultural production (Lawrence 2005, Styger et al. 2007). Farmers 
generally rotate areas where they use fire (Mistry 1998), but with increasing 
anthropic pressure, rotation and fallow period become limited.  
Although fire is a primordial agricultural practice that has been used in 
many regions of the world (Mazoyer & Roudart 2002), it is often stigmatized 
as a lagging practice, used by smallholders who need “modernizing” (Costa 
2006; Carmenta 2013). Building on the argument of limited fallow period 
and short term benefits of fire, agronomy studies have aimed at identifying 
alternative methods, more than addressing other ways of managing fire 
(Pollini 2009). Slash-and-mulch (where fallow is finely slashed and left as 
ground cover to form mulch), direct planting combined to green fertilizers 
(using the same open area), mechanization with application of artificial 
fertilizers, are some of the options (Kato et al. 1999; Denich et al. 2004, 
2005). Studies reveal that on the plot, these systems have important benefits. 
An experimental study in Eastern Amazon demonstrated that GHG emissions 
in a traditional slash-and-burn plot were at least five times higher than a fire 
free rotation system with slash-and-mulch (Davidson et al. 2008). 
However, whilst the dynamics of nutrient flows and other biophysical 
aspects advance, much less research has focused on exploring drivers of 
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smallholder uptake of alternative technologies to fire. In fact, these 
agronomical considerations seem to be little taken into account by farmers to 
choose between fire use or other production alternatives. Labor saving and 
financial advantages of alternatives have been put forward by research 
(Denich et al. 2005), but have not seemed to convince the farmers (Pollini, 
2009; Villemaine et al. 2012).  
Although alternatives to fire may present different technical advantages, the 
perceptions of farmers on fire use and its advantages and limits is more 
determinant (Mistry, 1998). Since agronomy studies have mainly aimed at 
finding alternatives to fire to recreate optimal soil conditions, largely ignoring 
(or even disdaining) fire management options and its advantages, they have 
overlooked an important aspect of the debate (Pollini, 2009).  
3.3. The social sciences point of view: fire as a risk to be managed 
On the contrary of other disciplines, social sciences investigate how 
farmers consider fire and manage it (Mistry, 1998), without developing a 
rhetoric against fire. However, a certain rational-centric vision leads to 
consider risk as a central element of decision making, whereas there is little 
evidence that perception of fire risk is that important.  
Capacity to engage in fire prevention is usually considered to depend on 
available household time or labor wages (Bowman et al. 2008). Mistry (1998) 
shows however that the perception farmers have of fire is determinant in 
influencing their fire management practices and adoption of alternatives, 
depending on what they consider the “good” and “bad” aspects of fire. These 
perceptions are determined by age, education, experience, and 
intergenerational relations (Mistry & Bizerril 2011).  
It is commonly considered that farmers will weigh the risk associated with 
fire to the possible damages it may cause, such as destruction of existing 
plantations of standing forest reserves (Bowman et al. 2008). However, risk 
evaluation may not always be rationale (Brondizio & Moran, 2008). When 
individuals misperceive risks, their behavior may differ from what is expected 
(Winter et al. 2010). For example, increase in forest inflammability does not 
seem to be perceived, leading to continue traditional practices (Brondizio & 
Moran 2008). Indeed, traditional populations would rely on the nearby moist 
forests to contain the blaze (Simmons 2004, Wetzler and Omi 1991), and still 
today, small-scale farmers seem to be more preoccupied in achieving a good 
burn to eliminate all detritus than in limiting the risk of fire escaping 
(Carmenta 2013).  
Moreover, the perceived controllability of a risk will influence whether 
individuals believe it is worthwhile to take protective action or not (Slovic, 
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1987). Carmenta (2013) shows that the farmers she studied don’t believe 
firebreaks can do much to against fire when it gets out of control and thus 
don’t include this in their management practices. Perceived responsibility for 
risk also plays a significant role in determining which risks are ultimately 
reduced, and by whom. Responsibility for controlling wildfire risk is 
generally viewed as having both public and private components, because 
actors all contribute to this risk and share, to varying degrees, in the 
consequences of destructive outcomes (Winter et al., 2010). Studies suggest 
that this can create a free-rider problem, if farmers are unwilling to invest in 
fire control let fire escape neighboring properties and cause damage 
(Simmons et al. 2005).  
These studies refer to the importance of community rules in limiting the 
free-rider problem, mainly for resource management (Agrawal and Ostrom, 
2001). However, hardly any study investigates this collective aspect of fire 
control. Simmons et al. (2004) test relations between political organizations 
along roads (ramais) and fire damage and find no conclusive result. Some 
studies show differences between traditional communities and more recent 
settlements (Bowman, 2008; Brondizio & Moran, 2008; Toniolo, 2004), 
which can be explained by a difference in practices but also by more social 
relations within the traditional communities. According to Brondizio and 
Moran (2008), the rate of population turnover in the Amazon undermines the 
availability of rural populations to learn, share, and develop forms of 
individual adaptation and collective action to cope with climate change or 
fire. Field studies show that in practice, relations between neighbors regarding 
fire is rare, if not inexistent, impeding higher collective control (Mistry 1998, 
Carmenta, 2013). 
Fire risk may in fact be of little concern in comparison to other risks. 
Brondizio & Moran (2008) suggest that farmers may evaluate the risk of 
changing their livelihood strategies to the risk of avoiding change. Studies 
have showed that often, people would rather live with risk than uncertainty, 
bringing them to favor well-known but risky situations (Brondizio & Moran, 
2008). 
Although social studies investigate fire management without any negative 
bias against, ground studies are still rare (Carmenta 2013) and comprehension 
of fire perception and drivers of fire management is mainly exploratory.   
************ 
Extensive ecological studies have investigated into the impact of fire and 
its consequences on ecological systems. Building on the same logic, 
agronomy studies have mainly shown the potential damages fire can cause, 
without looking into its advantages, and thus focus on developing alternatives 
to fire. In both cases, there is a certain negative bias regarding fire, impeding 
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to a more thorough understanding of the risks but also the advantages of fire 
use in agriculture. Although social case studies have looked into the 
perception of farmers on fire management, systematized knowledge is still 
scarce, and the few case studies show that applying risk theory or collective 
action theory may be misleading. 
4. Policies and institutional arrangements for fire prevention 
Although policies against wildfires in the Brazilian Amazon have been 
implemented since the early 1990s, their success is limited, wildfires still 
widely prevailing. Several studies show that these policies were influenced by 
the scientific community (Costa, 2006; Sorrensen, 2009; Pollini, 2009, but it 
seems that in most cases they were based only on mainstream scientific 
evidence, which led them to adopt a strong negative bias against fire, distant 
from the reality of farmers.  
Improved fire management and prevention will only be possible when we 
understand better the motivations which lead people to widely use fire and 
build policies accordingly (Mistry, 1998). As we present the different policies 
developed in the Brazilian Amazon to prevent fire and the rationale behind 
them, we will assess their success and limits by bringing light on farmers’ 
motivations and capacities to comply. 
4.1. Governmental monitoring and prohibition 
The warnings of ecological sciences on damages of fire on ecosystem 
services, combined to extreme fire events (1987, 1998), had strong 
repercussion within international institutions (in particular the World Bank) 
during the 1990s, bringing them to condition loans and support to Brazil to 
the implementation of command-and-control policies against fire (Sorrensen, 
2009).  
In general, command-and-control policies act through monitoring and 
control, enforcement varying with the size of penalties and changes to the 
style of inspections (May, 2004). But the efficiency of command-and-control 
policies depends upon the risks perceived by actors of being caught and 
punished, the benefits of not complying with the law, as well as on levels of 
respect for law and the State (Gezelius and Hauck, 2011) (Fig. 1). 
4.1.1. Enforcement conditions  
Initial focus of fire policies was on conservation units, with the PrevFogo 
(Sistema National para a Prevenção e Combate de Incêndios Florestais), 
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launched in 1989, who trained 5000 volunteers to combat fire hazard in these 
units. However, the 1998 fire in the Amazonian state of Roraima (which 
destroyed 10.000 km2 of primary forest) made apparent that this policy was 
not enough to face large-scale threats outside conservation units (Sorrensen, 
2009).  
This led to strengthen enforcement of prohibitive policies regarding use of 
fire in private properties. In 1998, a law on environmental crimes gave 
Brazil's environment agency IBAMA the mission to investigate and punish 
environmental crimes. The initiative was to enforce the Forest Act, which 
made burning without precautions illegal in private properties (since 1934). 
Burning licenses were required for any use of fire on private properties. 
However, capacities to deliver the licenses and to control private properties 
were low. In some states or municipalities, local laws chose to totally prohibit 
fire use, as in the state of Acre, evacuating the problem of delivering the 
licenses, but with no more capacity to control this fire ban. 
In parallel to this increased enforcement, an exceptional 10-year program 
was initiated in 1998, to contribute to prevent and monitor fire in private 
properties in the « arc of deforestation »: the ProArco (Monitoramento de 
Queimadas e Prevenção e Controle de Incêndios Florestais no Arco do 
Desflorestamento na Amazônia), through an emergency loan by the World 
Bank and support of PNUD. It combined educative prevention programs and 
the development of monitoring capacities, through satellite imagery. The 
development of remote sensing technology, which enabled to monitor fire 
through hot spots and fire scars, misled into considering that fire would be 
under control (Sorrensen, 2009). However, given the size of the Amazon and 
land occupation uncertainty, identifying hot spots is far from identifying 
culprits or being able to find them. Moreover, some researchers warn that 
remote sensing tools introduce an important asymmetry and bias regarding 
fire monitoring. For example, using the information reported in “hot spot” 
pixels, many aspects of the problem may still remain unknown such as the 
intensity of fire, the type of vegetation burnt, how fires were started, whether 
they were agricultural or accidental (Sorrensen, 2009).  
4.1.2. Level of deterrence and perception of authorities 
Besides the problem of enforcement and monitoring, different authors show 
that fire prohibition policies also greatly lacked legitimacy with local 
population. Mistry (1998) carried out a detailed study of farmers’ perceptions 
in the Brazilian savanna regarding the law and why they were compliant or 
not. He shows that most farmers knew that fire laws existed, but 65% of them 
were ignorant of the license permission needed to use fire and none knew of 
the procedure for obtaining it. In fact, obtaining this license can be fastidious, 
as it requires appearing in person in the environmental office (generally in the 
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capital) between 30 and 15 days before the date of fire and declaring an exact 
date. Carmenta (2013) shows through an ethnographic study that farmers in a 
region of the Amazon were generally incapable of saying exactly when they 
will burn, as it depends on ]many] climatic conditions, as well as household 
availability.  
Mistry & Bizerril (2011) also shows that farmers are often wary of 
government officials from IBAMA, mistrusting them as they are supposed to 
monitor and enforce prohibition. Farmers perceive that institutions condemn 
them for their use of fire rather than help them to find alternatives. These 
authors also point out how delicate the situation is for local staff of IBAMA: 
they fail to enforce the federal requirements demanded by the central agencies 
based in the capital, but at the same time they have no autonomy to make 
local agreements to promote controlled burns (Mistry & Bizerril, 2011).  
Fire prohibition policies aimed at limiting destruction of forests by limiting 
ignition sources, with a narrow interpretation of ecological studies. They 
proved to be insufficient because of limited monitoring and enforcement 
capacity, but also because they greatly lacked legitimacy with local actors, as 
they were incapable of taking into account their reality. This confirms 
analyses of command-and-control policies in other domains, where the 
capacity for state enforcement is lacking and where policy is conducted out of 
context of the practical realities of regions where laws are intended to be 
applied (Gezelius & Hauck, 2011). 
4.2. Encouraging alternatives to slash-and-burn 
The knowledge brought by the agronomy community mainly contributed to 
define alternative technical models. Policies have focused on encouraging 
demonstration units, considering adoption of fire-free practices would 
naturally expand, but have largely overlooked how to favor the conditions 
which would enable farmers to adapt their agricultural practices. 
Compliance studies show that adoption of new practices depends both on 
technological and market opportunities, and on the adaptation capacity of the 
farmers (Winter & May, 2001) (Fig. 1). 
. 4.2.1. Technical opportunities 
Although intensification of land use has been viewed as an important 
solution against fire, policies in this perspective have long been limited to 
encouraging research to develop alternatives. Several programs were carried 
out, from the mid-1990s to current days, through international partnerships: 
ASB (Alternative to Slash and Burn), coordinated by ICRAF ; Tipitamba led 
by the Brazilian agronomical research institute EMBRAPA (Belém) initially 
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in cooperation with German institutions (Denich et al.., 2004, 2005); 
FLOAGRI, led by Embrapa and Cirad (Sist et al., 2010). There was a certain 
belief that such innovation would naturally expand (Pollini, 2009). Even 
though these programs were carried out through field experiments within 
farmers’ properties (Oliveira et al., 2009), adoption in the areas remained very 
limited, even after more than 10 years of research presence (Pollini, 2009 ; 
Villemaine, 2012). Economic viability of these systems may be an issue 
(Börner et al., 2007; Drigo et al., 2013), but Villemaine et al. (2012) also 
show that local institutions (in particular technical assistance and banks) 
remained external (and dubious) to these programs, impeding the 
development of sociotechnical innovation networks which would be 
necessary for the up-scaling of such alternatives. 
Sorrensen (2009) considers that the main limitation to fire prevention is the 
lack of a supportive institutional context, namely for technical assistance, 
credit and land regularization. For example, between 1985 and 1999, over 
57% of the families settled by INCRA (the Land Reform Institute) were in 
Amazon region, but they received 3 to 11% of total credit funds (Sorrensen, 
2009). In fact, most small-scale farmers don’t have any title, impeding access 
to credit, and often leading to high turnover in land settlements. Some studies 
have proved that when farmers are permanently settled, they reduce the 
amount of fire use in agricultural practice (Almeida & Uhl, 1995), revealing 
the importance of land regularization. 
But as Villemaine et al. (2012) point out, such institutional limitations are 
not inescapable. Innovation does not only depend on its technical-economical 
potential and on the institutional context, but also on how farmers and other 
stakeholders will take up this issue, depending on their interests. Based on this 
political view, Villemaine et al. (2012) argue that currently, it is not only the 
institutional capacity which is lacking but also interest of the institutions in 
alternatives. Almost all credit is directed towards cattle breeding which 
benefits from strong economic drivers, as large-scale breeders need small-
scale farmers. Moreover, municipalities and banks generally put forward 
tractors as the solution against fire, seen as a modern technical model, 
enabling good credit business, and stimulating the development of the 
machinery sector (Villemaine et al. 2012).  
Since 2009, the federal government has tried to develop a more supportive 
context by launching the “Arco Verde” program, mainly as a way to show it 
could also be supportive after the strong command-and-control operation 
“Arco de Fogo” in 2008. This program aimed at accelerating land 
regularisation (with the Terra Legal program) (Dezorzi et al., 2011) and 
encouraging pilot farms with support of Embrapa in each of the 43 
municipalities targeted. The Terra Legal program has been much delayed and 
pilot units are just starting, making it difficult to estimate its possible success.  
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4.2.2. Adaptation capacities 
Field studies to understand why alternatives to slash-and-burn are not 
adopted show that farmers see them as a costly investment, requiring more 
work and bringing little return the first years, and allege difficulties in access 
to information, inputs, equipments and credit (Mistry, 1998; Börner et al. 
2007; Drigo et al. 2013; Villemaine et al. 2012). Other authors show that 
household strategies in relation to fire are also influenced by limited access to 
markets and labour (Bowman et al. 2008) 
One of the main stakes is to understand farmers’ strategies within the 
broader farming system (Deffontaines and Petit, 1985; Landais and Balent, 
1993). Although agronomy studies see the advantages of such alternatives 
through a productivity lens, putting forward the high yields and little 
degradation, farmers take into account a much broader view to choose 
options. Pollini (2009) argues that cropping systems are generally part of a 
combination of activities and that farmers do not specialize in the most 
profitable one according to simple criterion. They prefer combining a larger 
range of crops, to avoid dependence and minimize risk. Even farmers who 
develop alternatives such as agroforestry will continue to use fire in cropping 
systems to guarantee food security (Pollini, 2009). Thus, market access may 
not have as much influence as alleged, as subsistence involves very different 
motivations (Gezelius, 2004). 
Brondizio and Moran (2008) point out that adaptation is not only a matter 
of individual choice, but depends on the wider community. They refer to 
social differentiation, but also to the environmental context. Indeed, in a fire-
prone community, investing in fire-free alternatives (in particular in 
perennials) may be discouraged by the risk of destruction by accidental fires 
(Nepstad et al 1999, 2001; Pokorny et al., 2012).  
 
Policies for alternatives to slash-and-burn are still rare, and they tend to 
focus only on productivity issues, ignoring that farmers decide their practices 
within a larger farming system. Several authors consider that small-scale 
farmers in fact don’t yet have the option of turning to alternatives to fire 
because of the lacking institutional context (Sorrensen 2009; Mistry & 
Bizerril 2011).  
4.3. Promoting rules to manage fire risk 
The knowledge built by social sciences follows a different dynamic in 
relation to policies. It is part of an iterative process, between actions carried 
out by local institutions and movements, analysis by scientists and up-scaling 
through policies.  
Social regulations, including trust, recognition within a group, and moral 
beliefs have gained increased importance in analyses of compliance 
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motivations (Ostrom, 2005). Policies to promote such arrangements are 
generally based on efforts to decentralize power and control (Agrawal and 
Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom, 1998), in order to give greater legitimacy to rules, as 
they become better adapted to local contexts. Nevertheless, local enforcement 
capacity remains an important precondition (Gibson et al., 2005). It also 
depends on the sense of responsibility and awareness developed by local 
actors (Tomer & Sadler, 2007) (Fig. 1). 
4.3.1. Social control and empowerment 
Seeing the limits of the command-and-control and of the innovation 
paradigms, different initiatives progressively emerged in the late 1990’s to 
promote “best-practice” rules to manage fire within smallholder communities. 
The forerunner initiative was led by IPAM (Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental 
da Amazônia), an NGO1 who worked on fire impacts on ecological systems. 
They developed the program “Bom Manejo de Fogo” which involved 
coordination of local communities, collecting information on practices linked 
to fire to establishing an agreement on fire with the communities2(Carvalho et 
al., 2007). Carvalho et al. (2007), who implemented this program in the 
National Forest Reserve of Tapajos (located in Santarem, Pará), assess that 
agreements were developed with almost half the families living in the 
Reserve, and that during the years in which the program was carried out in the 
reserve (from 2001 to 2004), accidental fire was reduced by 75% (previously, 
accidents were reported for 61% of swidden fires, and decreased to 13%). In 
2003, the Ministry of Environment invited IPAM to formulate the new 
national policy within Proarco, to promote environmental education of 
community leaders (Carvalho et al., 2007). 
Other similar actions were initiated in the early 2000s: NGO-led initiatives, 
such as Fogo Emergência Crônica (Friends of the Earth); federal networks 
such as Proteger (Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico, with 500 institutions); 
international partnerships, such Amazônia sem Fogo, between Brazil and 
Italy, now extending to Bolivia (Costa, 2006; Carmenta, 2013). In an 
extensive and thorough analysis of these initiatives, Costa (2006) reports that 
all the information campaigns carried out by different programs followed 
similar features, in the forms used by communication and in the suggested 
rules. Costa (2006) estimates that the communication models (meetings, 
leaflets) they used often limited the possibilities of interaction with local 
                                                       
1	  Founded by reknown ecology scientists such as Daniel Nepstad, which shows the links of 
such actions with research. 
2	  The “best practices” promoted by the agreement were amongst others: choose well the place 
to clear ; give notice to the neighbours; ask for burning licence; bring down dry trees; wait for 
the first rain; make fire breaks; burn during cool hours; take water to the burning spot; monitor 
burning.	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farmers. They presumed that fire practices were unknown or “inappropriate”, 
and that by sharing information on “best practices”, they could raise 
awareness on fire management.  
4.3.2. Awareness and responsibility 
Costa (2006) shows that reduction in hotspots following these experiences 
was only temporary and that practices encountered a few years later differed 
from the best practices recommended. Carmenta (2013) observes a similar 
mismatch between what people reported doing and what they actually did 
(81% report making firebreaks, but only 7% do), revealing that they are aware 
of best practices, but can’t implement them (eg. bringing water to the burning 
site) or consider them as inadequate (eg. firebreaks are considered futile).  
These findings reveal the different conceptions of the fire risk and of what 
would motivate farmers to take prevention measures. Sorrensen (2009) 
estimates that policy and programs tend to see fire as an emergency, when at 
the local level, fire is something much more familiar, to which smallholders 
have nuanced attitudes, seeing no urgency in changing. Moreover, several 
authors point to the fact that many traditional farmers (such as caboclos) have 
a different conception of losses and damage. Our own experience in the field 
has showed that loosing annual crops is not considered through individual 
economic valuation, as farmers can count with the solidarity of the 
community.  
Escaped fire is never reported to be sanctioned (although strong sanctions 
can exist for other acts, such as theft) (Carmenta 2013, Mistry 1998), probably 
because in the local viewpoint it is considered involuntary and a fatality 
which could happen to anyone. When asked about recuperation of damages, 
traditional farmers did not understand, considering this as a strange 
conception (Carmenta 2013). Community responsibility for fire accidents is 
rarely admitted, farmers (or dwellers) often accusing people external to the 
community for fire start (Winter & Fried 2010). In fact, the risky nature of 
fire makes it difficult to investigate the effort put into the control or the 
intentionality. Kull (2002), in Madagascar, investigates the issue of “criminal” 
or “protest” fires, in which farmers intentionally let fire escape control, to 
then take advantage of the situation. However, such studies have not been 
carried out in the Brazilian context. 
Costa (2006) alleges that the main interest of farmers in participating in 
definition of “best practice” rules may in fact not be to limit fire damage. 
Studying the power relations established during the information campaigns, 
she concludes that for farmer institutions, these discussions were often the 
first time they were invited to take part in determining NGO agendas and in 
policy making. For them, this was an opportunity to gain access to a political 
field in which they could negotiate what really interested them, which was 
developing economically viable production systems.  
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Although education programs did not condemn fire use, they relied upon 
very few studies and knowledge about fire management practices. This has 
led them to a certain ingenuousness, regarding the reasons why farmers used 
“inappropriate” management practices, their perception of fire risk and the 
fact that community control and sanctions did not make sense for fire. 
5. Discussion 
Based on the analysis of current studies on fire, we take stock of previous 
policies and institutional arrangements and point to their limitations. As 
presented earlier, we chose not to focus on the failings of the institutional 
arrangements in terms of capacity and funding, but on the rationale behind the 
policies and programs. Our objective was to identify the way policies think 
they will solve the fire problem and see if the conditions they suggest are in 
line with what could motivate actors to change. This has led us to question the 
types of knowledge used by policy making and their relevance given farmers’ 
motivations. 
5.1. How has knowledge about fire influenced policy? 
The first point our analysis shows is that the knowledge used to base 
policies is characterized by a bias against fire which makes it distant from 
local realities. Since most studies were initiated following a context in which 
fire had destructed large forest areas, they tended to radically ban the use of 
fire, disregarding local practices. Ecological studies characterized the large 
environmental impacts, but brought little information regarding the causes 
and origin of such large scale fires. Thus command-and-control policies 
focused on reducing ignition sources from small-scale farming, in a context 
where most livelihoods still depended on fire (Sorrensen 2009). Agronomy 
studies mainly suggested alternatives to fire, instead of contributing to a better 
understanding of how to improve fire management (Pollini 2009). In a context 
where supportive institutional conditions to alternatives are clearly lacking, 
bringing radical change rather than incremental change is questionable. Some 
social studies tried to better characterize perception of fire and management 
practices (Mistry 1998; Carmenta 2013). However, in the absence of more 
systematic studies on fire practices, education programs tend to consider 
farmers use “inappropriate” practices because of a lack of information, and 
that communication campaigns would be sufficient to bring change in 
practices (Costa, 2006).   
Limitation of current scientific knowledge on fire is a growing 
preoccupation (Carmenta et al. 2011, Mistry & Bizerril 2011). First of all, the 
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bias against fire must be overcome. Studies ought to question “established 
truths” against fire which only lead to ban fire (Pollini 2009). For this, 
scientists must accept that farmers voice the research agenda, as has occurred 
in European countries, where research has been progressively brought to work 
together with farmers on their fire practices (Ribet 2005, Bernard-Laurent & 
Weber 2007). One of the stakes is to detach swidden fires from the anti-fire 
narrative and large forest conflagrations (Carmenta 2013). There is also a 
need to investigate with scientific tools the rationale behind current fire 
practices, instead of considering they are irrational beliefs (Mistry & Bizerril 
2011). Secondly, although some studies cross ecological and social aspects, 
there is a general lack of understanding of feedback between levels and 
determinants. Better understanding fire escape and fire spread from a mixed 
ecological and social approach would help determining more precisely the 
risk involved in agricultural use of fire and could lead to fruitful discussions 
with local actors. Thirdly, ground-based studies to identify determinants of 
fire use and management solutions are insufficient. Pollini (2009) warns 
against the trap of proposing the solution before understanding the context 
and considers that it is fundamental to analyze pathways taken by local actors 
to address their changing environment. In this perspective, authors call for 
more participatory approaches to explore possible solutions to the fire issue 
(Carmenta et al. 2011).  
5.2. Are policies consistent with motivations to use fire? 
The second point we bring through is that motivations to manage fire or 
change practices are not as simple as those expected by policies. Command-
and-control policies assume that farmers will fear being caught burning 
without a license, but farmers are hardly aware of such conditions and as they 
depend on fire for their livelihood, they consider such measures as totally 
illegitimate (Mistry 1998). Innovation policies seem to assume that farmers 
will also wish to increase crop productivity and limit soil degradation, but 
farmers do not seem to be aware that fire causes such agronomical problems 
(Mistry 1998) and develop other strategies to compensate potential losses 
(Pollini 2009). Education policies consider that farmers will be enthusiast to 
discover risk limiting practices, but in fact, farmers seem to have a different 
conception of risk, and the risk of changing may be higher than continuing 
practices they know work (Brondizio et Moran 2008; Carmenta 2013). Other 
studies also suggest that social control may have an important role in 
controlling fire risk, but turnover in communities is high, impeding such 
dynamics (Brondizio et Moran 2008).  
Gezelius and Hauck (2011) show in the context of small-scale fishery how 
the limit between subsistence and economic activities brings out varying 
compliance motivations and that the non-respect of rules is considered 
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legitimate for subsistence activities but is culturally condemned if it’s to make 
money. This aspect cannot be ignored in the case of fire. The difference 
between small-scale and large-scale farming is rarely taken into account. 
Communication campaigns were directed only towards small-scale farmers, 
implicitly recognizing that large-scale farmers do not lack information but 
have economic motives for their practices (Costa, 2006). It would be 
important to better understand these varying motivations to adapt policies to 
the different types of farmers.   
Moreover, fire presents particularities which make it difficult to approach 
from usual compliance theories, which identify the person responsible for an 
undesirable behavior. Liability and responsibility issues make it difficult to 
control the effort in limiting fire, or capacity of the communities to monitor 
and sanction risky behaviors (Barlow 2012, Carmenta 2013). In our 
experience in the field, we have often met farmers who declare they would 
like more external control related to fire accidents, as they are incapable of 
having internal control on such a tricky issue. This shows well that there is a 
need to explore policy mixes which can combine authority, incentives and 
awareness building. 
5.3. Towards more participative approaches to fire policy 
One of the criticisms made to command-and-control or conventional 
market-incentive policies is that they generally work best under constant 
conditions and do little to promote learning dynamics which are fundamental 
to bring about change (Boyd 2008, Voss & Bornemann 2011). By contrast, 
pro-active policies for empowerment, capacity building and innovation can 
help create the space for new knowledge and perceptions to emerge, for social 
interaction, and social learning (Leeuwis & Pyburn 2002). Whilst nobody can 
be “complied to learn", such learning processes can stimulate motivations 
linked to an awareness of a need to change, willingness and ability to 
participate in this change (Marshall & Marshall 2007). 
We consider that the stake is not only to develop better knowledge of fire 
or of farmer motivations, but integrating the construction of such knowledge 
in a process so it can be mobilized by the different stakeholders and translated 
into adequate policies (Coudel et al. 2011). Several studies show concern 
regarding the unilateral direction of information and the lack of space for 
dialogue on the fire issue (Carmenta 2013, Sorrensen 2009, Brondizio et 
Moran, 2008). Farmer organizations ought to be involved in defining the rules 
and stop being treated only as targets. Instead of producing panacea rules 
(Ostrom 2007) and “best practices”, it seems important to discuss principles 
of action which would orient the type of action to take in a given situation 
(Röling & Wagemakers 1998). Based on such principles, monitoring and 
information systems could be adapted to local realities, instead of 
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perpetuating the cultural divide between the scientific lexicon and the farmers 
pratices (Brondizio et Moran 2008).  
 
It seems urgent to develop prospective and participative approaches in 
which ecological, agronomical and social points of view could be discussed 
among researchers and with different stakeholders (farmers, extension agents, 
policy makers, etc.), to define policies which would take into account the 
complexity of the fire issue and stimulate adaptation. In fact, this literature 
analysis was a prelude to a prospective process we intend to carry out in the 
coming year. To support collective reflection in relation to complex 
socioecological systems, some approaches have been developed combining 
participative simulation and scenario building, such as the Companion 
Modeling approach (http://www.commod.fr, Etienne 2010). These 
instruments can enable to mediate among different stakeholders and favor 
exchange of perceptions, appropriation of knowledge and discussion of 
collective scenarios (Becu et al. 2008). The Commod methodology aims at 
revealing elements that wouldn’t emerge in conventional interviews, enabling 
the stakeholders to take some distance from reality and debate issues which 
may be conflictual or taboo. We hope this process will encourage discussion 
about different components of current institutional arrangements and enable to 
explore possibilities to limit fire risk, in particular by revealing motivations 
and discussing possibilities of different policy mixes. 
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